The Oakland-Berkeley Hills Fire: An Overview

By Captain Donald R. Parker
Oakland Office of Fire Services


Captain Parker was the "Division C" commander, in charge of operations at the Claremont Hotel on October 20, 1991. He is assigned to the Oakland Division of Training.


Sunday, October 20, will be remembered as the date of one of this nation's most costly fires; the worst fire involving loss of life and property since the Great San Francisco Earthquake and Fire of 1906.

The magnitude and scope of what is simply referred to as the "Tunnel Fire" is far beyond the experience of any living American firefighter. Only those who fought the Chicago Fire last century or battled the Great Fire in San Francisco would be able to identify with this conflagration and firestorm... .

The origin of the fire was on a steep hillside in what some have called a box canyon above state Highway 24 near the entrance to the Caldecott Tunnel. This is a wooded area with heavy underbrush, narrow streets and steep terrain. The unusual weather conditions are described in FEMA's Hazard Mitigation Report as follows: "...an unusual east wind, at speeds in excess of 65 miles per hour, that raced down from the crest of the Oakland-Berkeley Hills. Coupled with record high temperatures well into the nineties, the hot, dry winds gusted and swirled through five years of drought-dry brush and groves of freeze-damaged Monterey pines and eucalyptus trees. All the conditions for a major disaster were present that morning of October 20, 1991."

More than 25 firefighters were on the scene overhauling hot spots from a fire the previous day. It is important to note that Saturday's fire had been well overhauled; hose lines were left in place surrounding the burn area, the fire area was checked by Oakland fire companies during the night, and fire crews had been on the scene hours before ignition on Sunday.

These are prudent and accepted firefighting methods.

Eyewitness accounts testify that a sole ember blew into a tree just outside the burn area, and the tree exploded into flame, and the resulting fire was quickly out of control -- raging around and over firefighters who were indeed fighting for their lives.

Rescue and evacuation efforts were made as firefighters were forced to fall back to defensible space.

A request for additional fire units and air drops were immediately called for. Soon, streets were clogged with residents trying to get out, sightseers and emergency personnel trying to get in.

The fire quickly established four fronts, west downhill toward state Highway 24 and the Rockridge District, north toward the Claremont Hotel, south toward Broadway Terrace and east toward Contra Costa County.

The Oakland fire department is divided into three battalions commanded by an assistant chief and two battalion chiefs.

Assistant Chief Donald Matthews assumed command as the operations chief, Battalion Chief James Riley was assigned as Division A commander and Battalion Chief Ronald Campos responded to the Oakland Fire Dispatch Center to coordinate recall, dispatch, finance and logistics functions. Assistant Chief John K. Baker responded from home and assumed the role of incident commander.

At about 11:45 a.m., Director of Fire Services P. Lamont Ewell arrived on scene at the command post and officially assumed command.

The Oakland fire department uses the Incident Command System (ICS) to manage all emergency incidents, as was the case with the "Tunnel Fire."

The system consists of an incident commander who directly supervises four functional groups: operations, planning, logistics and finance.

The operation and planning functions were conducted at the scene from the department's mobile command post, while logistics and finance functions were conducted from the dispatch center.

This was the basic structure of initial management of the "Tunnel Fire," and intact until late into the evening when the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CDF) provided an overhead management team to assist with the enormous task of managing such a large fire.

At this point, a joint command was established that consisted of Oakland, Berkeley, Piedmont and the Department of Forestry.

Oakland firefighters were assisting with evacuation efforts as they were forced to retreat from the advancing inferno. Division Chief Riley and Oakland Police Officer John Grubensky were killed while trying to help citizens escape the fire. Both Chief Riley and Officer Grubensky were found with the remains of those people they were trying to help.


There were many problems that confronted both line firefighters and managers as the fire progressed.

  • Rapid spread of the fire in many different directions.

  • The fire had established the burn area boundaries by late afternoon, probably around 4 p.m.

  • Water Supply

    Fire units lost water, forcing them to retreat because the supply tanks and reservoirs were emptied. Loss of water occurred primarily because of:

    1. Fire suppression efforts
    2. Citizens wetting roofs and vegetation
    3. Water service flowing freely in destroyed homes
    4. Tanks and reservoirs could not be refilled because of fire-caused electrical failure
    5. Many mutual aid fire engine companies could not connect to Oakland fire hydrants because they utilize two-and-one-half- inch hose couplings and Oakland fire units use three inch couplings

  • Mutual Aid

    Requests for mutual aid in the form of air support and fire suppression units were made during the initial stages of the fire, and additional requests were made throughout the day.

    1. Seventy-four type-one strike teams [five engines each]
    2. Aircraft from hundreds of miles away made hundreds of water and retardant drops

    This was the largest mutual aid effort ever undertaken in the State of California.

  • Communications

    Radio communications were often difficult or impossible because:

    1. Overload (too many units on the same channel)
    2. Too few mutual aid channels available
    3. Steep, hilly terrain interfered with radio signals

  • Lessons Learned

    The Oakland fire department is currently addressing a number of the problem areas identified with suppression activities, as well as those conditions which permitted the fire to develop in the first place.

    Some of those issues are:

  • Weather

    While no one can control the weather, efforts can be made to identify hazardous weather conditions and communicate those conditions to concerned agencies. The Oakland fire department intends to install a weather monitoring station in the Oakland-Berkeley Hills to monitor weather conditions. This station will be directly linked to the California Department of Forestry, as well as other agencies.

  • Mutual Aid

    Planning sessions are taking place to discuss methods of enhancing the mutual aid system.

  • Water Supply

    Many proposals are currently being investigated to augment the system.

    Some of proposals are:

    1. Acquire above-ground portable water delivery systems
    2. Investigate the feasibility of standardizing hydrant connections
    3. Install cisterns and pumping stations at strategic locations

  • Codes and Ordinances

    1. Require Class "A" [non-wood] roofing in Hazard Threat Zone
    2. One-hour exterior construction in Hazard Threat Zone
    3. Residential sprinklers in Hazard Threat Zone

  • Communications

    Oakland city departments will begin conversion to an 800-Mhz radio system in early 1992. It is expected that this will eliminate much of the overload of tactical channels that was experienced during the initial stages of the "Tunnel Fire."

    In addition, proposals are being made to fire departments surrounding the City of Oakland which will permit those jurisdictions to participate in the 800-MHz trunked radio system.

  • Vegetation Management

    The Oakland fire department intends to intensify the existing vegetation management program by increasing the public education component of the Hill Area Hazard Abatement Program.

  • Fire Statistics

    Deaths.......................................................................................25
    Injuries....................................................................................150
    Single Family Dwellings Destroyed..........................................2,843
    Single Family Dwellings Damaged.................................................193
    Apartment Units Destroyed..............................................................433
    Total Living Units Damaged or Destroyed..............................3,469
    Total Acreage Burned by the Fire..............................................1,520
    Fire Perimeter................................................................5.25 Miles
    Estimated Dollar Fire Loss......................................$1,537,000,000


    Capt. Donald R. Parker
    Oakland, California
    January 1992
    SFFD Commission Minutes
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